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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal to this Court taken from the trial court's grant of permanent 
physical custody of the parties minor child to Respondent entered on January 31, 
1997. 
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah 
Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by giving give undue significance 
to Respondent as the primary caretaker of the parties' minor child in determining 
permanent custody when both parties had been co-caretakers of the child before the 
Respondent was granted temporary custody by the trial court and the reason Appellant 
did not have custody during that time was because of the temporary order? 
Grounds for Review and Standard of Review 
Appellant appeals the final order granting permanent custody to 
Respondent at a domestic trial held on January 31, 1997. 
Trial court Judges are accorded broad discretion in determining the 
permanent physical custody of a minor child. Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 
(Utah 1996). Therefore, the standard of review of the Court is limited to a 
review of the trial court's findings of fact for an abuse of discretion. 
Additionally, the issue was preserved at trial. See Record at 226-227. 
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B. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it weighed the Appellants 
prior criminal history against him and for the Respondent in determining his fitness as 
a father when the criminal incidents occurred before the child was born and the 
Appellant has no criminal history after the birth of the child? 
Grounds for Review and Standard of Review 
Appellant appeals the final order granting permanent custody to 
Respondent at a domestic trial held on January 31, 1997. 
Trial court Judges are accorded broad discretion in determining the 
permanent physical custody of a minor child. Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 
(Utah 1996). Therefore, the standard of review of the Court is limited to a 
review of the trial court's findings of fact for an abuse of discretion. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no statutory provisions related to the issues at hand. However, an 
analogous statute is found in Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-3(2): 
In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the 
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best 
interests of the child, including allowing the child frequent and 
continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the court finds 
appropriate. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
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A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of an order granting permanent custody of the parties' minor 
child to Respondent entered by the Honorable Jon M. Memmott on January 31, 
1997. This case is before the Court today because the trial court relied on a 
finding of fact concerning Respondent's role as the primary care taker of the 
minor child for the two and a half years prior to the trial. However, up to the 
time that the parties separated both parties shared in the raising and care of their 
child. After separation, Respondent was granted temporary custody which 
forbade Appellant from continuing as a caretaker to his daughter. 
Also, the court weighed Appellants prior criminal history against him 
when the incidents occurred before the birth of the parties' child. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below. 
The case came before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott at a Domestic Trial held 
November 22, 1996 and January 31, 1997. At which time, the court, "by the 
slimmest of margins," granted custody to Respondent. Record at 235. 
C. Statements of the Facts 
1. Appellant and Respondent had a child born June 4, 1994 out of 
wedlock and have never been married to each other. 
2. Appellant has never denied and has admitted paternity during the 
entire course of the child's life. 
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3. Appellant and Respondent shared caretaking responsibility of their 
minor child until November 1995. During this time Appellant would care for 
their child from noon until midnight while Respondent worked and at other 
times convenient to the parties. 
4. Appellant is and was at all times on permanent disability which 
allowed him to provide personal care to the child and Appellant provided care 
whenever it was needed. 
5. The parties broke off their relationship in November 1995. 
6. After breaking off the relationship, Respondent denied Appellant 
visitation, forcing Respondent to have to resort to legal action. 
7. In January 1996, Commissioner Allphin, granted custody to 
Respondent and ordered that Appellant be granted visitation which was to be 
gradually increased over the next 90 days to the point that Appellant had 
overnight visitation. 
8. In March 1996, just a few weeks before the 90-day period ordered 
by the Court, Respondent decided to move to Idaho under the pretext of being 
closer to her family rather than comply with overnight visitation. 
9. The Commissioner ordered overnight visitation in favor of 
Appellant. 
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10. Respondent would only allow overnight visitation one or two days 
at a time causing much disruption in the child's life as she was constantly being 
driven back and forth between Utah and Idaho several times a month. 
11. In May 1996 the Court ordered week long visitations. 
12. During the time that Appellant did not have visitation he made 
numerous attempts to contact his child by telephone. Some times he would hear 
his child playing in the background, but Respondent would deny him contact 
with their child. 
13. At trial Appellant testified to several alcohol related offenses 
occurring prior to the birth of the parties' child. See Record at 65-70. 
A. Appellant was arrested for DUI on May 16, 1985. 
B. Appellant was arrested for DUI on December 12, 1986. 
C. Appellant was convicted of alcohol related reckless driving on 
April 21, 1989. 
D. Appellant was convicted of having an open container of alcohol on 
February 25, 1992. 
E. Appellant was convicted of Alcohol Related Reckless on February 
25,1994. 
14. On January 31, 1997 after concluding the domestic trial, the Court 
issued its findings of facts and analyzed seven factors. 
A. The Stability of the Parties. 
i. Both parties have exhibited a high degree of immaturity. 
"[A]s to the stability of both parties, I think particularly as 
to issues of maturity, I think both parties show a fairly high 
degree of immaturity for their age." Record at 228. See 
Also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at \ 10 (A) 
i i That both parties are able to provide a suitable environment 
and are relatively equal under a review of the standard 
concerning the stability of their financial condition and 
lifestyle. See Record at 228-229 and See Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law at \ 10(A). 
B. The effect of maintaining the primary custodial relation. 
i. "Over the past 2Vi years, the life of the child, the Defendant 
has provided more of the minor child's primary care than 
the Plaintiff. As a result it is in the child's best interests to 
maintain the Defendant's primary custodial relation with 
the child" Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law at f^ 10 
(B) See also, Record at 232. 
ii. "I think it was clearly demonstrated in this case, however, 
that the plaintiff has done more primary care taking in a 
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significant factor than most fathers would in this case and 
has the ability and skill to provide primary care and has in 
the past." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at Tf 10 
(B), See also Record at 232. 
C. Relative strength of the parties bonds with the child. 
i. Both parties have an equally great love and bond with the 
child. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at \ 10(C). 
D. Relative ability of the parties to provide a suitable environment for 
the child. 
i. The parties are of relatively equal ability to provide a 
suitable environment for the minor child. Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law at f 10(D). 
E. Character and emotional stability of each party. 
i. The Plaintiffs five alcohol related traffic offenses cast a 
negative light on his character. 
ii. The Defendant's character is more favorable when 
compared to Plaintiffs in relation to the child's best 
interest. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at f^ 
10(E). 
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F. Commitment to provide care for the child and the relative 
parenting skills of the parties. 
i. This factor favored neither party. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at f^ 10(F). 
G. Ability and willingness of each party to facilitate the visitation of 
the minor child with the noncustodial parent. 
i. "The ability and willingness to provide visitation would 
clearly favor the plaintiff in this case." Record at 234. See 
also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at f^ 10(G). 
15. In summing the factors the court reasoned that". . . two of the 
factors [favor] the mother probably more than the father. One factor favors the 
father probably at a significant level and all other factors being equal." Record 
at 234-235. 
16. After weighing the relative factors the found made its ruling: 
"Given those, the Court would find, and by the slimmest of margins in this, that 
the mother is more suitable on the factors and would award custody to the 
mother in this case with liberal visitation." Record at 235. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
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The District Court abused it's discretion in awarding permanent custody of the 
parties minor child to the Respondent. There were two ways in which the court 
abused it's discretion. First, the court used the effects of a temporary custody order 
and gave weight to Respondent having custody of the child prior to the trial. The sole 
reason that Appellant was unable to share in the custody of his daughter during the two 
and a half years prior to trial was because of the temporary order. From the time that 
his daughter was born to the date that temporary custody was awarded, Appellant 
shared in the upbringing and raising of his daughter as an equal caretaker. Utah case 
law prohibits the reliance on a temporary order when issuing an order of permanent 
custody. As the court should not have relied on the effects of the temporary order and 
the parties shared in the caretaking of the child before the issuance of the order, the 
trial court abused its discretion. 
A second abuse of discretion came when the trial court placed undue weight on 
the Appellant's prior alcohol related offenses. Offenses which occurred before the 
Appellant knew that Respondent was pregnant with his daughter. Upon learning of the 
impending birth of child, Appellant turned his life around and had no further offenses 
related to alcohol. The failure of the trial court to take note that Appellant had no 
alcohol related offenses in the two and a half years between the birth of child and the 
date of trial was an abuse of discretion. The weight that the court put on this issue 
went directly to the court finding that the factor of character favored the Respondent. 
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A review of the factors taking account the abuse of discretion by the trial court, 
leaves six factors favoring neither party over the other and one factor favoring 
Appellant. Therefore the case should be remanded to the District Court to review the 
issue of permanent custody. 
ARGUMENT 
B. Custody Under a Temporary Support Order. 
The trial court abused its discretion in using the factor that Respondent had been 
the primary caretaker when the sole reason she was the primary caretaker was because she 
had been awarded custody under a temporary court order. Up until the time that the trial 
court granted temporary custody, both parties shared in raising their child. Effectively, 
the parties were joint caretakers until they separated. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly ruled that temporary custody orders are not 
to be treated as permanent custody. As the Court held in Tucker: "A temporary custody 
order is only that, temporary. . . . It is not to be treated as permanent custody. . . . 
Accordingly, this court has held that a temporary order should not be given the weight of 
a permanent order." 910 P.2d at 1215-1216. The rationale for not giving a temporary 
order the same weight as a permanent order is quite clear: 
If a temporary order of custody were to be given permanent status subject 
to Hogge ys changed-circumstances test, no party would ever stipulate to a 
temporary arrangement and every hearing on temporary custody would 
involve time-consuming presentation of witnesses, both expert and lay, as 
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well as other types of evidence. In short, a temporary custody hearing 
would become a permanent custody hearing. 
Id at 1216 
In the present case now before the court, the trial court clearly abused its discretion 
by relying on the Respondent's temporary custody contrary to the rule in Tucker. In 
reviewing the factors it considered in determining custody, the court ruled that for the 
most part the parties were equal in all but three factors {See Record at 228-235). The two 
facts that favored Respondent were: 
1) Respondent's custodial relationship with the child, and 
2) Respondent's character and emotional stability. See Record at 234. 
With regards the first of these factors, clearly, the court should not have favored the 
Respondent because she was the primary caretaker. As the Court acknowledged, prior to 
the District Court granting Respondent temporary custody, both parties shared equally in 
providing care for the minor child. Appellant did not choose to forego custody of the 
child. In fact, he did all there was in his limited power to be an active part of his child 
life. As the trial court pointed out, Appellant "...has done more primary care taking in a 
significant factor than most fathers would in this case and has the ability and skill to 
provide primary care and has in the past." Record at 232. Appellant's hands were tied 
by the temporary order. The Court in effect issued a temporary order, without benefit of 
a full evidentiary hearing and custody evaluation which gave one party temporary and 
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then used the temporary order as one of the basis for denying him visitation. In effect, 
it is the concern expressed in Tucker, supra to life. 
The appropriate way for the trial judge to have addressed the issue of custody was 
set forth in Tucker. Afer the expiration of the temporary custody period, 
[a]ssuming each party remains fit and proper to serve as the custodial 
parent, in order for plaintiff to be successful in seeking custody, she need 
not make a showing of changed circumstances in the usual sense that is 
required to modify an order of permanent custody. She need only make a 
showing that an award of custody to her would best serve the interests of the 
child. 
Tucker at 1216 citing Boah v. Boals, 664 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Utah 1983) (emphasis in 
original). Therefore, all Appellant had to show was that it would be in the best interest 
of the child for him to be granted custody. The Court should not have found that the 
Respondent was the primary caretaker. The evidence was that before the Court 
intervened, the parties were equal in providing care for the minor child. 
If the factor of temporary custody is given it's proper weight, that is, equal to both, 
Respondent is left with only the factor of her character and emotional stability in her 
favor. She wins the benefit of the doubt in this case because she does not have the history 
of alcohol offenses that the Court notes exist on Appellant's record. This is, in effect, the 
flip side of that issue, which is addressed later. 
The Court listed one factor in Appellant's favor. The court found that Appellant 
would be able and willing to provide visitation to Respondent. See Record at 234. The 
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Court recognized that the Responded had systematically attempted to deny Appellant 
visitation and tried to deny him the father/daughter relationship he was entitled to enjoy. 
This was summed up by Appellant when he testified that the Respondent had wanted to 
know when he would accept the fact that he was nothing more than a sperm donor. See 
Record at 47-48. 
Even with the errors by the Court indicated above, the court recognized and 
expressed its knowledge of the relatively equal position of the parties. After addressing 
and weighing the relative factors the court ruled, "Given those, the Court would find, and 
by the slimmest of margins in this, that the mother is more suitable on the factors and 
would award custody to the mother in this case with liberal visitation." Record at 235 
(emphasis added). Taking out the court's reliance on the temporary custody order, it is 
possible that the court would have come to a different outcome on the issue of custody. 
The court in determining custody should look to the reason why one party that had 
been a caretaker in the past had his or her caretaker status changed. Specifically, the 
court should look at the "...reasons for having relinquished custody in the past." Sukin 
v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 924-925 (Utah App. 1992). Appellant in the present case, had 
shared in the care taking of the minor child prior to the order of the court granting 
temporary custody to Respondent. From the time that the child was born to the issuance 
of the temporary order, Appellant took an active role in the caretaking of his daughter. 
The present factual situation is not one where the Appellant decided to have nothing to 
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do with his daughter. Instead he fought the entire time for custody and access to his 
daughter. Had the court not granted temporary custody to the Respondent, Appellant 
would have continued to take an active role as a caretaker of his daughter. 
Additionally, the trial court failed to take into account the fact that Appellant was 
on permanent disability and would be able to provide personal rather than surrogate care 
to their child. In Sukin, this Court stated that the court should consider the relative 
position of the parties to provide personal rather than surrogate care. 842 P.2d at 924-
925. In the present case, Appellant would clearly be able to provide twenty four hour a 
day care for his daughter. He is on disability and is unable to work. This disability allows 
him to stay at home and be with his daughter. On the other hand, Respondent either 
works or is seeking employment as a nurse and is unable to provide the attention that 
Appellant can provide. 
Considering the Court found for the Respondent by only the slimmest of margins 
found in favor of Appellant on the custody issue, it is clear that the balance would have 
shifted if the Court had not erred in viewing the Respondent as the primary caretaker and 
failed to take into account that the Appellant could provide personal care, whereas 
Respondent would need surrogate care 
C. Appellant's Prior Criminal History. 
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In addition to the reliance on the temporary support order, the trial court also 
weighed heavily Plaintiffs prior alcohol related traffic offenses. See Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at ^flO(E). This is in fact the basis for the Court finding that the 
"character issue" was in balance in favor of the Respondent. The Court erred in giving 
weight to these old offenses. The dates of those offenses had an eight-year time span 
from 1986 to 1994. The last offense occurred several months before the birth of 
Appellant's daughter. After learning that Respondent was pregnant with his child, 
Appellant actively sought and in fact did turn his life around to become more responsible. 
No offenses occurred between birth and trial, a period of almost three years. 
The use of the offenses by the trial court was an abuse of discretion as it related 
to Appellant's ability to provide care for his child. In fact, the Court, as noted above 
stated that Appellant did an exceptional job in that area. After the birth of the child, 
Appellant kept his record clear of any similar offense in order to be a good father. He 
learned responsibility for his actions. Appellant had no offenses between 1994 and 1997. 
The reason for the court to consider alcoholic offenses is clear. In Sukin, this 
Court stated that the trial court should consider the " . . significant impairment of ability 
to function as a parent through drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other cause . . . " 842 
P.2d at 924. Appellant's prior offenses do not effect or impair his ability to function as 
a father. In fact the trial court specifically stated that Appellate was a adequate father and 
at least as suitable a parent as the Respondent. As the trial court Judge stated: "I think it 
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was clearly demonstrated in this case . . . that the plaintiff has done more primary care 
taking in a significant factor than most fathers in this case and has the ability and skill to 
provide primary care and has in the past." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 
[^ 10(B), see also, Record at 232. 
Also, both parties were found to be able to provide a suitable environment and 
were found relatively equal under a review of their financial condition and their lifestyle. 
See Record at 228-229; see also, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at ]flO(A). The 
court clearly viewed the parities as equal in their ability to care for their daughter. The 
court admitted that Appellant had given primary care to his daughter in the past. But for 
the temporary order, he would have continued this level of care. The above statements 
are inconsistent with finding the character issue favored Respondent and should have 
been held against Appellant. Without the character issue, the Court had to find that the 
parties had one factor favoring each party. However, as shown above, the primary 
caretaker issue is a red herring and should not have been considered as a factor in favor 
of Respondent. Appellant and Respondent are therefore equal in their ability to care for 
the minor child. In effect, there is no evidence showing indicating where it would be in 
the best interest of the child to reside. The matter is evenly balanced, except for one 
factor. The Respondent repeatedly interfered with the relationship between Appellant and 
Respondent. The opposite was not found to be true. Therefore, with proper evaluation, 
-16-
all factors are in balance between the parties except the last. Appellant should have been 
awarded custody "by the slimmest of margins." 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused it's discretion in awarding permanent custody of the parties 
minor child to the Respondent. In analyzing seven factors, the court found that in 
all but three, the parties were equal. The court found that two factors favored 
Respondent: the effect of maintaining the custodial relationship and the character and 
emotional stability of the parties. One factor was found to favor Appellant: the ability and 
willingness to facilitate the visitation of the minor child with the other parent. 
The Court erred in finding that those two factors favored the Respondent. The 
Court erred when it used the effects of a temporary custody order and gave weight to 
Respondent having custody of the child prior to the trial for the reasons set forth above. 
As the foregoing discussion shows, Utah case law prohibits the reliance on a 
temporary order when issuing an order of permanent custody. As the court should not 
have relied on the effects of the temporary order and the parties shared in the caretaking 
of the child before the issuance of the order, the factor of maintaining the custodial 
relationship should favor neither party. Removing this factor, the court is left with one 
factor in favor of each party. 
The second was also erroneously found to be in favor of Appellant when the trial 
court placed undue weight on the Appellant's prior alcohol related offenses. The offenses 
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occurred before the Appellant knew that Respondent was pregnant with his daughter. 
After learning of the impending birth of child, Appellant strove to and did in fact turn his 
life around. The trial court erroneously put weight on historical behavior not supported 
by the recent behavior and failed to properly consider that Appellant had no alcohol 
related offenses in the two and a half years between the birth of child and the date of trial 
was an abuse of discretion. The weight that the court put on this issue went directly to 
the court finding that the factor of character favored the Respondent. 
Removing the weight put on the alcohol offenses and the primary custody issue the 
trial court would be left with one solitary factor favoring one party over the other. Clearly 
based on the ruling of the court and which is uncontested, the factor of which parent 
would better provide access to the other party to the child for visitation favors Appellant. 
A review of the factors taking account the abuse of discretion by the trial court, 
leaves six factors favoring neither party over the other and one factor favoring Appellant. 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully asks this Court to remand the issue of 
permanent custody to the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted this ' ^ day of February 1999. 
David R. Maddox 
Attorney for Appellant 
• 1 8 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ' ' day of February 1999 I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Reply Brief to the persons at the address listed below by depositing 
a copy in the United States Mail, postage prepaid. 
TWILA GOUGH 
Defendant Pro Se 
670 North Fleming #2 
Idaho Falls, ID 83406 
s — ^ — ^ ^ 
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DECREE OF PATERNITY, 
CHILD CUSTODY, CHILD 
SUPPORT AND VISITATION 
Civil No. 944701877 PA 
Judge: Jon M. Memmott 
The above-entitled matter came before this Court for a 
trial heard by the Honorable Jon M. Memmott on November 21, 1996. 
This matter was not concluded on that date so that Plaintiff 
would have an opportunity to present additional expert testimony. 
Plaintiff's expert was unavailable on the aforementioned date. 
This matter reconvened on January 31, 1997, at 1:00 p.m., and 
additional testimony was presented. The Court having considered 
the parties stipulation concerning child support, having reviewed 
documents, testimony and evidence on the issue of child custody 
and having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
hereby, ADJUDGES, DECREE AND ORDERS as follows: 
Mathie v, Gough 
Decree of Paternity, Child Cusotdy, 
child support and Visitation 
1. The Plaintiff is adjudged the natural father of 
McKinlee Marie Mathie, born to the Defendant on June 4, 1994, 
2. The care, custody and control of the parties minor 
child is awarded to the Defendant with liberal visitation rights 
awarded to the Plaintiff as follows: 
Telephone visitation between the child and the 
noncustodial parent, here the Plaintiff, should occur once during 
the work week and once during the weekend- The time for such 
telephone contact should be as the parties agree, or 8:30 p.iru 
The Plaintiff's visitation with the minor child should 
consist of the first full week of each month for the calendar 
year 1997 and 1999, until the child enters public school, and the 
second full week of each month for calendar year 1998- Holiday 
visitation is to follow this jurisdictions standard visitation 
schedule. For every month that contains a holiday on which the 
noncustodial parent is entitled to visitation, the one week 
visitation period with in that month will be enlarged to 
incorporate another day, making the period of visitation for that 
month eight (8) days, unless the noncustodial parent elects to 
provide all necessary transportation of the child incident to 
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visitation on the actual date of the holiday. Christmas 
visitation should consist of one week before or one week after 
Christmas, either termination or beginning on Christmas day at 
1:00 p.m. Summer visitation shall be for the period of six 
(6) weeks. During this period the custodial parent shall be 
allowed one weekend of visitation with the minor child. The 
parties are free to modify the above visitation schedule by 
stipulation. 
The Court orders that the parties maintain the current 
allocation of transportation costs regarding the child's 
visitation. The Plaintfff should be responsible for receiving 
the child at the home of the Defendant and transporting her to 
the location of visitation. The Defendant is responsible for 
retrieving the child and returning her to Defendant's home 
following the monthly visitation period or the summer visitation 
period. 
3. Plaintiff shall pay $164.00 per month as and for the 
support of the parties' minor child, pursuant to the "Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act," Utah Code Ann. §78-45-1 sL seq. 
(See attached Child Support Obligation Worksheet.) 
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a) Plaintiff shall pay child support, other than any 
Court-ordered child care costs, on or before the 5th of each 
month to the Utah State Office of Recovery Services (P.O. Box 
45011, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0011), unless the Office of 
Recovery Services notifies Plaintiff that payments shall be sent 
elsewhere. When public assistance is being provided for the 
parties' minor child by the State, the ongoing child support 
shall be awarded to the State of Utah. When public assistance 
is not being provided for the parties1 minor child, the ongoing 
child support award shall be awarded to Defendant. 
b) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §62A-ll-403, §62A-11-501 
et. Seq., and §78-45-9, if the Office of Recovery Services 
enforces the child support order, Plaintiff's income shall be 
subject to immediate and automatic income withholding as of the 
effective date of the order, regardless of whether a delinquency 
exists. 
C) Each party shall keep the Office of Recovery Services 
informed of changes in his or her address, employment, income, 
or medical insurance coverage. 
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D) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §62A-ll-320.5, each party 
to this action may request that the Office of Recovery Services 
review the Court's child support order for this action to 
determine whether a modification of the Court ordered child 
support shall be pursued. 
E) The issue of any past due child support owed by 
Plaintiff which accrued during a period when Defendant was on 
public assistance shall be reserved and shall be determined by 
further judicial or administrative agency proceedings. 
4. If medical, dental and/or optical insurance is 
available to either party at a reasonable cost, the party that 
can obtain the more favorable coverage shall maintain such 
insurance for the parties' minor child. Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-
45-7.15 both parties shall share equally, (1) the out-of-pocket 
costs of such insurance premium actually paid on the child's 
behalf, and (2) all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical 
expenses including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the 
dependant child. 
5. If the Defendant goes back to school to acquire the 
necessary skills for employment of if the Defendant becomes 
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employed, Plaintiff shall be responsible and liable for one-half 
of the reasonable child care costs incurred each month as a 
result of Defendant's schooling or work. Plaintiff shall pay his 
portion of these child care costs directly to Defendant by the 
5th of each month. 
6, Plaintiff shall maintain life insurance on his life 
for the benefit of the parties' minor child, when it is 
reasonably available, and shall name the parties' child as the 
beneficiary on said life insurance policy. 
7 . The parties shall alternate, each claiming the child 
as a dependant for the tax purposes every other year. 
8 . The Court orders both parties to complete the Divorce 
Education for Parents Classes, 
DATED this ~7 day of ftpSrl, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
6 
Mathie v. Gough 
Decree of Paternity, child cusotdy, 
Child Support and Visitation 
NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 RULES OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 the Rules of Judicial 
Administration and Rule 6(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
undersigned will submit the foregoing document to the District 
court Judge for signature at the expiration of eight (8) days 
from the date this Notice is mailed to you unless written 
objection is filed prior to that time. 
DATED this of April, 1998. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF 
PATERNITY, CHILD CUSTODY, CHILD SUPPORT AND VISITATION was 
mailed, via first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this £c7^day 
of April, 1998, to the following: 
David R. Maddox 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
9160 South 300 West 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No, 944701877 PA 
Judge: Jon M. Memmott 
The above-entitled matter came before this Court for a 
trial heard by the Honorable Jon M. Memmott on November 21, 1996, 
This matter was not concluded on that date so that Plaintiff 
would have an opportunity to present additional expert testimony. 
Plaintiff's expert was unavailable on the aforementioned date. 
This matter reconvened on January 31, 1997, at 1:00 p.m., and 
additional testimony was presented. The Court having received 
the exhibits, testimony, argument of counsel, being fully advised 
in the premises, and good cause appearing, hereby rules and 
enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Mathie v. Gough 
Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
Civil No. 944701877 PA 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Defendant was an actual and bona fide resident 
of Davis County, State of Utah, for more than three months prior 
to the commencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are not now, nor have they 
ever been married to each other. 
3. The parties have one minor child together, to-wit: 
McKinlee Marie Mathie; born on June 4, 1994. 
4. The parties have agreed and acknowledge in open court 
that Plaintiff, Gary Mathie is the father of the above mentioned 
minor child. 
5. Plaintiff was previously ordered to pay temporary 
child support in the amount of $164.00 per month, and pursuant 
to the "Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act", Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-1 et seq. this amount will continue until modified by 
Court order. The above amount is based upon the income of the 
Plaintiff and Defendant. Said child support shall be subject to 
automatic withholding as a means to collect delinquent and 
ongoing child support, as provided by U.C.A., §62A-11-401 ££ seq. 
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6. The parties shall maintain health, optical, hospital 
and dental insurance for their minor child if it is reasonably 
available to either of them. All medical expenses not covered 
by said insurance shall be divided equally between the parties. 
7. If Defendant goes back to school to acquire the 
necessary skills for employment or if Defendant becomes employed, 
Plaintiff shall be responsible and liable for one-half of the 
reasonable child care costs incurred each month as a result of 
Defendant's schooling or work. Plaintiff shall pay his portion 
of these child care costs directly to Defendant by the 5th of 
each month. 
8. Plaintiff should maintain life insurance on his life 
for the benefit of the parties1 minor child, when it is 
reasonably available, and shall name the parties1 minor child as 
a beneficiary on said life insurance policy. 
9. The parties should alternate, each claiming the child 
as a dependant for tax purposes every other year. 
10. Concerning the issues of custody and visitation of 
the minor child the primary standard used herein is the "best 
interests of the child." In this matter a formal custody 
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evaluation was not performed. In an effort to determine what 
custody and visitation scheme would best serve the minor child's 
interests the court analyzed seven (7) factors. The analysis is 
as follows: 
A. The stability of each party. 
Both parties have exhibited a high degree of immaturity, 
relative to their age, concerning issues of the child's welfare 
and neither party has exhibited strong characteristics toward 
work and employment. However, in general, the lifestyles of each 
parties is stable. The parties are relatively equal under a 
review of the standard concerning the stability of their 
financial condition and lifestyle. 
B. The effect of maintaining the primary custodial 
relation. 
Over the past 2 1/2 years, the life of the child, the 
Defendant has provided more of the minor child's primary care 
than the Plaintiff. As a result, it is in the child's best 
interests to maintain the Defendant's primary custodial relation 
with the child. However, the Plaintiff does not lack the skill 
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and ability to care for the minor child and has provided more of 
the child's necessary care than most fathers typically provide. 
C. The relative strength of the bond between the child 
and each of the parties. 
Both parties hold genuine love an affection for the minor 
child. The strength of bond between each of the parties and the 
child is extremely strong and therefore equal. 
D. The relative ability of the parties to provide a 
suitable environment for the child. 
The Defendant's smoking is detrimental to the child's 
health and welfare. The Defendant's family support, due to her 
living in Idaho, is of benefit to the child. The Plaintiff has 
displayed a lack of sensitivity to the issues inherent in the 
raising a young lady by maintaining in his home a calendar with 
photographs of women that this Court deems offensive. However, 
the physical facilities provided by the Plaintiff at his home for 
the minor child are excellent. Under a review of these factors 
the parties are relatively equal in their ability to provide a 
suitable environment for the minor child. 
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E. The character and emotional stability of each party. 
The Plaintiff's five alcohol related traffic offenses 
cast a negative light on his character. Defendant has no 
criminal record of any kind. Under a review of this factor the 
Defendant's character is more favorable when compared to that of 
the Plaintiff's in relation to the child's best interest. 
F. The commitment to provide care for the child and the 
relative parenting skills of the parties. 
An assessment of the evidence presented relating to this 
factor favors neither party. 
G. ihe ability and willingness of each party to 
facilitate the visitation of the minor child with the 
noncustodial parent, 
Under a review of this factor the Plaintiff has evidenced 
a greater willingness to seek and maintain visitation between 
himself and the minor child is in the child's best interest. 
11. The Court finds the Defendant to be more suitable on 
the above custody evaluation factors and that, it is in the best 
interest of the child for the Defendant to retain custody of the 
parties minor child. 
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12. Telephone visitation between the child and the 
noncustodial parent, here the Plaintiff, should occur once during 
the work week and once during the weekend. The time for such 
telephone contact should be as the parties agree, or 8:30 p.m. 
13. The Plaintiff's visitation with the minor child 
should consist of the first full week of each month for calendar 
year 1997 and 1999, until the child enters public school, and the 
second full week of each month for calendar year 1998. Holiday 
visitation is to follow this jurisdiction standard visitation 
schedule. For every month that contains a holiday on which the 
noncustodial parent is entitled to visitation, the one week 
visitation period within that month will be enlarged to 
incorporate another day, making the period of visitation for that 
month eight (8) days, unless the noncustodial parent elects to 
provide all necessary transportation of the child incident to 
visitation on the actual date of the holiday. Christmas 
visitation should consist of one week before or one week after 
Christmas, either terminating or beginning on Christmas day at 
1:00 p.m. Summer visitation shall be for a period of six (6) 
weeks. During this period the custodial parent shall be allowed 
7 
Mathie v. Gough 
Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
Civil No. 944701877 PA 
one weekend of visitation with the minor child. The parties are 
free to modify the above visitation schedule by stipulation. 
14. The court finds that the parties should maintain the 
current allocation of transportation costs regarding the child's 
visitation. The Plaintiff should be responsible for receiving 
the child at the home of the Defendant and transporting her to 
the location of visitation. The Defendant is responsible for 
retrieving the child and returning her to Defendant's home 
following the monthly visitation period or the summer visitation 
period. 
15. The parties herein should be ordered to attend the 
Divorce Education for Parenting Classes. 
Based upon the forgoing, the Court hereby makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS QF IAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
subject matter herein. 
2. The Defendant should be awarded the permanent care, 
custody, and control of the parties minor child, McKinlee Marie 
Mathie, born June 4, 1994. 
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3. P l a in t i f f is the ch i ld ' s natural father and should 
pay child support to the Defendant in the amount of $164.00 per 
month. 
4. I t is in the chi ld 's best interest that the Plaint iff 
be awarded v i s i t a t i o n as scheduled above. 
DATED th i s "7 ^ day of P&Srl, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 RULES OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 the Rules of Judicial 
Administration and Rule 6(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
undersigned will submit the foregoing document to the District 
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court Judge for signature at the expiration of eight (8) days 
from the date this Notice is mailed to you unless written 
objection is filed prior to that time. 
DATED this /O^^day of April, 1998. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, via first-class U.S. 
Mail, postage prepaid, this ffi^day of April, 1998, to the 
following: 
David R. Maddox 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
9160 South 300 West 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
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1 custody to her would best serve the interest of the child. 
2 And it specifically said plaintiff need not make a showing 
3 of changed circumstances m the usual sense. And by saying 
4 that she's had the child for the last year that burden is 
5 being placed back on us, your Honor, and that's what their 
6 argument is. Again I heard status quo. That argument of 
7 status quo is directly contradictory to the case of Tucker 
8 versus Tucker, on a temporary order, your Honor, and I'm 
9 hoping the Court will see that as such and view this as the 
10 first permanent custody order and look only at what is m 
11 the best interest of the child long term. Thank you, your 
12 Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you. 
14 The Court will make the following findings and 
15 rulings in this case. The primary stand of the Court is it 
16 is in the best interest of the child as was testified I 
17 think significantly that there was no custody evaluation 
18 done m this case. As a result, there is, really the best 
19 evidence that a Court should have, particularly m the type 
20 of highly contested custody case this is m which there are 
21 many facts in dispute. I mean quite honestly, I had a 
22 situation where the plaintiff got on and gave one set of 
23 facts and circumstances and the defendant got on and gave 
24 another set of facts and circumstances. And there was 
25 nothing presented in a way that would establish that one's 
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credibility is substantially any better than the others. 
In fact, I think the Court's observation is is 
that I think both parties explained the facts as they see 
them through their circumstances and their eyes. And I 
think that both parties viewed themselves as a victim of 
the other party in this case. In fact, very significantly 
viewed, and to the point it's almost out of control. 
Because I was amazed, I have never had a case before me 
where I have had so many incidents of police coming in to 
enforce visitation on both sides. Where they would go to 
there and use the police or the police would be involved in 
enforcing visitations or a call to the police officer to 
enforce visitation. And that does not seem to be 
productive. 
As to the issues, though, with the best interest 
of the children, as to the stability of both parties, I 
think particularly as to issues of maturity, I think both 
parties show a fairly high degree of immaturity for their 
age. The behavior that is exhibited by both parties is 
almost teenage behavior instead of adult behavior on both 
parties in terms of how they are handling and dealing with 
the situation involving the children. 
There was raised certain issues, the work 
situation, the relative abilities of the parents to provide 
a suitable environment, I think also deals with stability. 
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1 I The defendant, Twila Gough, has been unemployed since 
2 I January of 1995. Prior to that she has worked in a nursing 
3 I home and so she is capable of working but, but part of her 
4 ! testimony is the primary responsibility so she could home 
5 j and care for the child. She moved back to Idaho so she 
6 j could be with her family and provide greater care for the 
7 j child and I think that a number of those factors are to her 
8 I benefit in that, for taking care of the child and I know it 
9 1 was characterized as moving back home as to cut off the 
10 j child but I think there are some positive benefits from 
11 j moving where she has the support of a family environment. 
12 i MR. MADDOX: (inaudible) father (inaudible) the 
13 child up. 
14 THE COURT: Are we still arguing? 
15 MR. MADDOX: No, your Honor, I apologize. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you. That the defendant, or the 
17 I plaintiff in this case, his home environment, his living 
18 conditions are very stable. He provides, I think the 
19 physical facilities for the child is excellent. The 
20 testimony was of neighbors and friends that the home 
21 conditions are excellent, the yard provisions for the 
22 children are excellent physical provisions for the child. 
23 As to his own relative ability, he indicates that 
24 he has a permanent disability. There was some concern 



























indicates that he does, can do, and does a considerable 
amount of umpiring and his physical disability is such that 
it doesn't prevent him from umpiring, little league 
umpiring, and those kind of things which is somewhat 
j strenuous. I've been involved as an umpire doing softball 
games and others and there is a certain amount of strain 
and it extends the Court's credibility a little bit to 
indicate that he can do substantial umpiring for a number 
of time and yet his disability is such that he can't do any-
type of work or light work or other work in terms of 
providing long term for the child. It raises some concern 
for the Court. It doesn't seem to be consistent in terms 
of testimony and ability to work but I think both parties 
have not exhibited strong characteristics as far as work 
and employment and those kinds of, in this situation 
neither party has. 
Also, as to a suitable environment, that there is 
some indication that testimony was that defendant smokes in 
the car and home and I think that's detrimental for small 
children if you smoke in the home and car where the child 
is. That provides a level of detriment to the child. 
The Court does find in terms of suitable 
environment that the character and emotional stability is 
another factor that must be considered and the Court does 
consider and believe that the fact that defendant has five 
230 
1 alcohol related offenses that would have some indication 
2 J where charges have been made and there was one theft charge 
3 I in 1992, the criminal trespass was dismissed, but I think 
4 it is indicative of the disputes they're having over 
5 j visitation. 
6 MR. MADDOX: Your Honor, if 1 could just to 
7 j correct the Court. The plaintiff had that record not the 
8 defendant. 
9 j THE COURT: That's correct. The plaintiff had the 
10 I record and I think he's to be commended that it has changed 
11 | but I still think that life style character, it's part of 
12 | his character and life style. I think there has been an 
13 explanation as to the calendar and the concern of the 
14 calendar had to do with the sensitivity, his sensitivity to 
15 those factors in relation to long term, if I'm going to 
16 award custody in bringing up a young lady, sensitivity to 
17 those issues of having and presently those. And I think it 
18 exhibited a lack of sensitivity which would affect, some 
19 effect on the character of the plaintiff. 
20 The commitment to providing custodial parent and 
21 j providing needs of the child both were excellent. Very 
22 strong, I think they are both very concerned in providing 
23 for the needs of the child. 
24 The relative strength in the parental bonds, they 
25 are both extremely strong. I think both parents testimony, 
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1 j their attachment to their young girl is very strong and 
2 | that is to be commended with both parents. 
3 I Maintaining primary custodial bond, I think that 
4 j that factor in and of itself favors the defendant in this 
5 | case. That over the last two-and-a-half years, based on 
6 | the testimony, that the defendant has provided more of the 
7 j primary care taking of custodial care. I think it was 
8 i clearly demonstrated in this case, however, that the 
9 ! plaintiff has done more primary care taking in a 
10 i significant factor than most fathers would in this case and 
11 j has the ability and skill to provide primary care and has 
12 j in the past. 
13 J As to the issues of visitation. There are 
14 examples in this case and this is a very difficult case for 
15 the Court to deal with in terms of a relationship where 
16 it's a paternity action and as a result while there was, as 
17 least for a short period, there was some physical ties, 
18 there doesn't seem to appear to be any significant 
19 j emotional ties between these parties in terms of a family 
20 and parental relation and as a result that is going to 
21 I cause, I think, emotional feelings and circumstances that 
22 | make it much more difficult to deal with the child than in 
23 a marital relation. The fact that it may have the same 
24 I consequence to the child, I think, is true. However, the 
25 | impact on both the parties in dealing with each other is a 
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much more difficult situation, I think in a paternity 
situation, in their own minds where there are not any type 
of feelings and relations. So, I think there is going to 
be in and of itself, much greater conflict. 
And I think in listening uo the testimony of both 
of the parlies that the defendant's testimony was, you know 
allowing visitation of my child and the view of the child 
being hers. Where also the plaintiff's testimony was that 
the actions were in reference to what she, Twila, was doing 
to me. In terms of what was happening with visitation was 
what was happening to the plaintiff, not what was happening 
to the child and so the actions that were taken that he was 
and the motive and the background was what it was doing to 
him not what it was doing to the child. So that both 
parties were looking at this in a situation of involving 
their own personal interest and investment in the situation 
with neither party, based on the testimony that I have 
heard, taking or viewing the primary consideration of the 
child in this case. I donft think either party's testimony 
or background exhibited that their primary interest or the 
primary concern in viewing the visitation problems was the 
child but it was how it affected them personally in the 
situation and I don't think that that's in the best 
interests of the child. 
Given these factors and findings, I think that 
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1 the stability is really, of homes, is equal. The 
2 J maintaining of primary custodial relationship that has 
historically gone on would favor with the mother. The 
4 I relative strength of parental bonds is relatively equal. 
5 | The relative ability of the parent to provide to a suitable 
6 | environment is likewise equal. The character and emotional 
7 j stability, I think would favor the mother in this case. 
The commitment to provide parenting skills would favor 
9 I neither. The ability and willingness to provide visitation 
10 | would clearly favor the plaintiff in this case. So, the 
issue is, I think, --
12 j MR. OLDS: What was that last? I'm sorry, your 
Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Ability and willingness to provide 
15 visitation. 
16 MR. OLDS: Okay, I'm sorry. 
17 THE COURT: -- would clearly favor the defendant 
18 or the plaintiff in this case. And so, you have a 
19 I situation, I think, where two of the factors favor the 
20 J mother probably more than that father. One factor favors 
21 j the father probably at a significant level and all other 
22 j factors being equal. 
23 Now on that basis, then the Court is being asked 
24 to make a decision of custody. And it is almost a Soloman 
25 J decision, okay, we are going to cut the baby in half kind 
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of situation because the factors come out to be in some 
relatively equal. Given those, the Court would find, and 
by th^slimmest of margins in this, that the mother is more 
4 j suitable on the factors and would award custody to the 
5 j mother in this case with liberal visitation. 
6 i I think we need to deal with visitation in a very 
7 | structured fashion and the Court, where she's in Idaho, and 
8 | the transportation of neither party working, I mean there 
9 j isn't significant income, I mean transportation is always 
10 I going to be a significant problem. I think until the child 
11 j starts school that would allow the plaintiff to have his 
12 I weeks visitation plus any holidays that would fall during 
13 j that month that he has a weeks visitation. So, that if 
14 there is one holiday, you would add the holiday on to his 
15 visitation. If there are two holidays, you would add the 
16 j two days on. And then I would allow in addition to that 
17 very liberal extended summer visitation so that he would 
18 I have a period of six weeks during the summer of visitation 
19 of the child and during that six weeks that the plaintiff 
20 I would then have one weekend --
21 | MR. OLDS: Do you mean defendant? 
22 | THE COURT: Yes, defendant would have during that 
23 period of time one weekend that could be arranged somewhere 
24 I in the middle, the third, fourth, or fifth week that she 
25 could have the child for one weekend. The rest of the time 
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